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Abstract
In the first half of the 20th century, Arthur Bentley was a relatively well-known philosopher of the social 
sciences, who is today mostly remembered by his collaboration with John Dewey on their book, Knowing 
and the Known (1949), and for a very early study on group pressures, The Process of Government (1908). 
Now largely forgotten, Arthur Bentley developed a unique methodology and epistemology for social 
sciences that remains unique to this day.
Over the years, and especially in opposition to the «semiotic» of Charles Morris, Bentley developed his 
own system and vocabulary of signs, signals, designations and symbols, or rather the behavioural activity 
of «symboling», in support of his radical «floating cosmology», a fundamentally relational, pragmatic and 
thoroughly anti-dualistic epistemology. At the core of his thought is the concept of transaction, a general 
epistemological principle that sees all distinctions, such as organism-environment, perceptioncognition, 
subject-object etc., as subsumed under a more general whole, from which distinctions are drawn by an 
act of provisional reflection and naming. Thus all such dualisms and distinctions are treated as secondary 
separations within an integrated, inseparable whole, which in turn is constituted by the set or system of 
transactions proceeding in it.
The presentation will provide a short overview and introduction to Arthur Bentley’s thought as it pertains 
to semiotics, in the hope of rescuing the thought of this fascinating thinker from the obscurity into which 
it has today fallen.
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«Here Lies Obstinacy» offered Arthur Bentley as his own epitaph in a letter addres-sed to his long-time collaborator, the famous pragmatist philosopher John Dewey. «I am ruthless, irresponsible, willing to seem absurd, when necessary: I probably 
would not spare my best friend if his slaughter seemed important for what I was trying to do» 
(cited in Ryan 1997: 780-781).
Arthur Fisher Bentley, philosopher, political and social scientist, whom John Dewey 
considered as «one of the most genial men I’ve ever known» (cited ibid. 780), was born in 
1870 in the state of Illinois, USA, into the family of a banker in a small town of Freeport. He 
acquired a higher education partially in the Johns Hopkins University, partially in the univer-
sities of Berlin and Freiburg im Breisgau in Germany, and defended his doctoral dissertation 
in the Johns Hopkins University in 1895, titled Units of Investigation in the Social Sciences, 
in which he emphasized the crucial role of the internal properties of the human mind for the 
study of all social phenomena.
His dissertation, however, was entirely built on a foundation of mentalist vocabulary, 
something which he was to abandon entirely in only a few years’ time; indeed, it was his 
studies in Germany that played a crucial role in this. There he was introduced to the works 
of several influential German sociologists and economists, primarily Georg Simmel, Ludwig 
Glumpowicz and Émile Durkheim, who left in him a characteristically European streak, still 
relatively little felt in the United States at that time. Returning to the USA and heading to the 
University of Chicago, he and John Dewey were almost the only ones in that country who 
represented a society-centered perspective in their conceptions of the relationships between 
individuals and their surroundings, a view that could perhaps be briefly summarized by noting 
that it is much easier to derive an individual from the society than to get a society by putting 
together a set of isolated individuals.
Having graduated from the university and worked in the University of Chicago for only 
a year (1895-96), Bentley failed to acquire a suitable academic position and as he was also 
unsuccessful as a lecturer he disappointedly abandoned his scientific career and began wor-
king first as a journalist and then as an editor with the newspapers Chicago Times-Herald and 
Record-Herald. Researching social inequality and the conditions of the poor and the homeless, 
he didn’t find it disagreeable even to sleep on cardboard boxes in the slums together with the 
homeless, and from this close and immediate experience was born his best known work, The 
Process of Government (1908), a book that is today frequently thought to be his most important 
contribution to social sciences.
«Today this book is recognized as one of the great classics in the field of political 
science, not only for America, but for the world at large,» writes Sidney Ratner (1954: xi) in 
his introduction to a collection of Bentley’s papers, Inquiry into Inquiries: Essays in Social 
Theory (1954) that was published near the end of Bentley’s life, and then again in his obi-
tuary: «The Process of Government [...] is, in my judgment, the most important contribution 
to systematic political theory ever made in America» (Ratner 1958: 574). Already in this book 
there is to be found the rise of Bentley’s anti-mentalistic, action or behavior-based approach 
that he was to develop much more thoroughly over the course of his entire career. Proceeding 
from this viewpoint, he argues that the true nature of governmental processes lies only in the 
actually happening, concrete legislative and administrative actions and events, conducted by 
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concrete people gathered in particular groups and collectives. The core of the book consists of 
an analysis of group interests, more or less well-known in political philosophy even today, and 
which in the middle of the 20th century became one of the primary starting points for studying 
pressure groups.
Soon after the publication of this, in retrospect his best-known book, Bentley gave up 
his job as a journalist due to stress and mental exhaustion, moved to the state of Indiana, to a 
small town called Paoli and started to grow an orchard, with which he was engaged until his 
death in 1957. For the next sixteen years, he had essentially no engagement with philosophy 
or science at all, until his business became successful enough that it guaranteed him a steady 
and sufficient income that could support his future philosophical activities. From then onward, 
Bentley became extremely active, and during the next twenty eight years, he published four 
more monographs (one, Knowing and the Known (1949) co-authored with John Dewey), one 
collection of papers, and about three dozen other papers, on topics ranging from the theory of 
relativity, mathematics and linguistics to questions of epistemology and the relations between 
organisms and their environments.
During the 1930s and 40s, Bentley was phenomenally active: the majority of his publis-
hed papers were written during this period. Despite this, he also managed to write the book 
Behavior, Knowledge, Fact (1935), which he himself thought of as the culmination of his 
research. The problem that Bentley analyzed was the nature of the social fact, and in order to 
provide a sufficient answer to this question, he first abandoned any attempts to study social facts 
in isolation; instead, he attempted to define social facts as proceeding from the techniques and 
procedures used by the sciences themselves. The described facts as «behavioral» in the sense 
that facts are constructed by direct observation and the techniques used for this end, instead 
of independent mental operations or representations — systematically, he refused to allow 
as a fact any presentation or description that is not capable being directly and immediately 
observable in time and space. In addition to this analysis of methods and means to be used 
in the study of human behavior, Bentley also attempted to present a monumental «floating» 
or even «tellurian-sidereal cosmology» that sees all particular branches of the sciences as 
forms of local, situated knowledge that all have their own temporal extent, as functional and 
lacking any and all absolute foundations but are instead in a constant flux. This book with its 
«intractable, devastating logic of a process philosophy» (Lavine 1995: 39) is today rare even 
in second-hand bookshops and is rarely read.
In 1932, Bentley had sent his book, the Linguistic Analysis of Mathematics that had been 
published in that same year to John Dewey, who however left it unread for three years. But 
having finally picked up at the incitement of Ernest Nagel, he soon wrote back to Bentley with 
an apology and a comment that the book «has given me more enlightenment and intellectual 
help than any book I have read for a very long time» (quoted in Lavine 1995: 37). This letter 
laid the foundation to a long-lasting correspondence between the two philosophers that lasted 
for nearly twenty years until Dewey’s death in 1952 and comprised of nearly two thousand 
letters. Over the course of this correspondence they wrote together a number of papers, prima-
rily dealing with logical vocabulary and methodology to be used in the sciences, which were 
eventually published as Knowing and the Known (1949), and this was to become Bentley’s 
the second «epoch-making» (Ratner 1954: xiii) book. And indeed — primarily due to the co-
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authorship of John Dewey, this book does seem to be somewhat remembered today, having 
escaped the obscurity of almost all the rest of Bentley’s oeuvre. In this book, they attempted 
to develop a terminology and methodology that they called the «transactional» strategy and 
the purpose of which was to consider human behavior and thought entirely naturalistically, to 
place mind back into nature and to unite it once again with the ever-changing diversity of the 
surrounding world, and finally to resist the ever-proliferating dualisms that the separation of 
the knower, the known and the processes of knowing are bound to bring along. Their attempt 
was to depict «language, with all its speakings and writings, as man-himself-in-action-dea-
ling-with-things» (Dewey, Bentley 1949: 114), something that can only be accomplished only 
when «real» things are not separated from the mind, words from speakers, knowing from the 
known.
The resulting book was an ambitious, even pretentious work, with the transaction philo-
sophy at its core claiming to be the successor of pragmatism and thought of by Dewey as the 
capstone of his philosophical career. However, the book met with an entirely different reception 
from the critics. Characteristic is the comment by Paul Kress that the book is mostly reminis-
cent of the misadventures of a lost mariner, «who has thrown the compass of reason over the 
side as so much excess ballast» (1970: 178), since in that vague cosmic flux presented in the 
book all distinctions and details have become lost along with any sort of concreteness. Today 
it is not rare to exclude Knowing and the Known from the Dewey’s canon entirely, and it has 
definitely received the least attention among all of Dewey’s works.
Of all the different fields and disciplines Bentley was engaged with during his life, inclu-
ding political philosophy and philosophy of science, sociology, psychology and logic, there is 
one that has seen some renewed interest in recent times: the question of the boundaries of the 
object of research in studying activity, perception and cognition. Out of Bentley’s forgotten 
corpus, the one issue that ought to be recalled today is the question whether an organism’s 
outer boundary, one part of its physiological makeup, or put even more simply, its skin, is 
suitable as the line that bounds the unit of investigation for the «behavioral sciences» and 
foregrounds it as separate from the environment (cf. especially Bentley 1941a,b). There is a 
long-lasting picture prevalent in cognitive sciences that sees the operation of the mind as if a 
«cognitive sandwich» (Hurley 2001: 3), according to which cognitive processes can be divided 
into three superimposed layers, into perception, cognition and action accordingly. Under this 
view, perceptual processes and behavior or action are peripheral and secondary to «cognition 
proper», and it is precisely the latter — the tasty contents of the sandwich — that cognitive 
sciences ought to focus on and that remains more or less separate from perception and action, 
the two halves of bread. Cognition is, in this picture, a separate «higher» process that operates 
according to rules that are unique to it, such as by computation, and is entirely closed off inside 
the boundaries of the organism. For «cognition proper», perception is mere input and behavior 
mere output, and both of them remain as if outside the organism: on the one hand, perception 
consists of a stream of signals or stimuli arriving from the environment, and on the other hand, 
behavior is conceived of as an application of entirely internal mental representations into the 
external environment for the purpose of attaining some goal. Cognition is thus a phenomenon 
characterized, among other aspects, but the fact that it is entirely internal to the organism, 
remaining within the boundaries of skin or skull.
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Today, however, there is a strong and increasingly more prevalent movement away from 
this way of thinking, towards more perception and behavior-centered treatments that perceive 
action, cognition and perception as closely and inseparably intertwined (e.g. Hurley 2001) and 
that see the activities of organisms in their environments as playing a crucial role in cognitive 
and perceptual processes (e.g. Noë 2004). And it is precisely this line of thinking that Arthur 
Bentley can be considered as one of the «forerunners», even if he is a progenitor most likely 
in name only, since as he has been largely forgotten it is doubtful if he has had any impact 
on these approaches. In several papers he posed the question, what is this unit or entity that a 
behavioral researcher should investigate, and over and over he reached the same conclusion: 
the human skin as a boundary is arbitrary and is unsuitable to be considered as the limit of a 
behavioral system. The behaviors of any organism, but especially that of human beings in their 
behaviors of knowing, extend beyond its skin and form coupled systems with some sub-set of 
environmental entities. Cognitive processes are not contained entirely within the individual, 
opposed to the world of things «out there», as many researchers today, decades after Bentley, 
are beginning to discover (e.g. Clark, Chalmers 1998).
During his lifetime, especially near its end, Bentley was praised constantly and overwhel-
mingly. «I have no doubt that future generations will honor Arthur F. Bentley not only for his 
great insights and profound understanding of complex problems in many fields, but also for 
his great courage in daring to advance challenging hypotheses that went counter to the domi-
nant fields and vested intellectual interests of his day,» Sidney Ratner wrote in his obituary 
to Bentley (1958: 577). Although a collection of papers titled Life, Language, Law: Essays 
in Honor of Arthur F. Bentley (1954) was published during Bentley’s lifetime, contrary to the 
wishful predictions of Ratner and others, his work was soon forgotten.[1] 
The reason for him becoming but a barely noticeable footnote in 20th century philosophy 
and political theory is unclear. Frank Ryan (1997: 780-781) suggests three possible explanations. 
The first and probably the most decisive reason may be Bentley’s excessively polemical, sharp, 
belligerent, quarrelsome way of writing. Second, Bentley’s ideas may have been simply unsui-
table for the general mood or milieu of the time he lived in. When The Process of Government 
was published in 1908 that dealt with interest groups and power struggles, most other resear-
chers in sociology in the circles Bentley moved in were more interested in studying national 
moods and sentiments, and the warnings against dualisms and «psychologisms» littered all over 
Knowing and the Known some forty years later were ignored by the philosophers of the time 
who mostly operated under positivist ideals. «In the mid 1940s,» Ryan writes, «Bentley and 
Dewey stood virtually alone at the end of a road later travelled by Wittgenstein, Schutz, Kuhn, 
Dummett and Putnam» (ibid. 780). And the third reason may be that with two brief exceptions, 
Bentley’s entire career developed outside the academia, he lacked necessary connections for a 
successful academic career and any recognition that might come from it.
[1] Besides this collection of papers, there have been only two monographs published dealing with Bentley’s 
thought: James Ward’s Language, Form, and Inquiry: Arthur F. Bentley’s Philosophy of Social Science (1984) 
and the already referenced Paul Kress’s Social Science and the Idea of Process: The Ambiguous Legacy of A. F. 
Bentley (1970). The philosophical correspondence between Dewey and Bentley has also been published (Dewey, 
bentley 1964).
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In certain respects, Bentley’s fall into obscurity may be rather justified, especially if 
we were to try and assess this «austerely magnificent Bentleyan floating cosmology spanning 
millennia in time and space» (Lavine 1995: 41), but reading Bentley’s polemical and not the 
most humble rhetoric that he fiercely applied to his intellectual opponents, one gets the feeling 
that despite his apparently hostile attitude, what has been lost is a brilliant and unique, often 
even humorous thinker who should be read even if just for his unique and idiosyncratic style, 
nowadays rarely seen in philosophical literature. In light of ongoing internalism-externalism 
debates and ecologically minded psychology, it would be good to recall Arthur Bentley’s 
ideas and to take a look at one of the earliest manifestations of these debates, characterized 
by his pragmatist philosophy and inquiries into how in living processes action, perception and 
cognition are all deeply intertwined. If for cognitive processes «there is nothing sacred about 
skull and skin,» as Clark & Chalmers put it (1998: 14), one should recall Bentley’s words, 
written already in 1910, that could be published without alteration in any of today’s work in 
cognitive science:
However spatially isolated the individual appears at a crude glance, the more minutely he is 
examined, the more are his boundary lines found to melt into those of his environment, the 
more frequently are functions found which work through both individual and environment 
so that it cannot be told where the one ceases and the other begins. (Bentley 1954: 5)
It is now time to turn to the connections between semiotics and Bentley’s ideas. The 
reason for trying to bring this obscure author back to light for semiotics is, in fact, because he 
developed his own system of signs and sign processes, and as such he should minimally be 
considered as part of the history of semiotics, although as an interesting author he is worthy 
of being scrutinized even more closely.
To begin with, it is important to understand the way Bentley thought about the role of 
a social scientist, or more generally, of the way that proper science should be done. Bentley 
thought of himself as a «methodologist» of the social sciences. By «methodology», he did not 
think simply the means or methods for conducting empirical research, but rather a sort of dual 
perspective which would simultaneously look at the concrete subject matter of science, and at 
the philosophical underpinnings, premises, beliefs, in fact the very conditions for the possibility 
of acquiring knowledge. In short, a methodologist reflects on the nature of that science, rather 
than merely the various research techniques used in the given discipline. Or in the words of Leo 
Strauss: «Methodology, as reflection on the correct procedure of science, is necessarily reflec-
tion on the limitations of science. If science is indeed the highest form of human knowledge, 
it is reflection on the limitations of human knowledge» (1971: 76). And it is precisely for this 
double goal: to do science and to reflect on the limitations of this knowledge, Bentley realized, 
at some point in his career, that he needs to turn to, or rather, invent semiotics.
The best example of this sort of a «methodological» approach is his book from 1935, 
titled Behavior, Knowledge, Fact, considered by himself as his most important and mature 
work. The problem that Bentley tries to analyze here is a classic one: the nature of a social 
fact. And as the very first step he abandons the study of social facts in isolation, as closed off 
into something self-contained. Instead, he presents the nature of social facts as stemming from 
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the very techniques and procedures used in the sciences themselves. Facts are «behavioral» 
not in the behavioralist sense, but in the sense that facts are constructed by direct observation 
and the techniques used in this activity of observation, rather than being either independent 
mental operations or representations, or simply things-in-themselves out there. Whereas even 
today there is a widespread belief in the opposing positions that sciences either discover the 
objective nature of the world, or that nature is culturally constructed, Bentley was already 
moving on an entirely different track, away from even putting the question in these seemingly 
opposite but in fact mutually reinforcing terms.
In fact, throughout his career, Bentley always emphasized the limited and local nature of 
all knowledge. One of his main interests was to figure out how this particular type of organism, 
commonly called the human being, with its limited capacities and means for experiencing 
and exploring the world, can come to knowledge. For him, all knowledge is always limited, 
temporary, postulational: nothing but sketches and musings presented in discourse that can be 
blown away at any given minute. This also leads to the conclusion that all knowledge has to be 
constantly maintained, constantly upheld – it is an activity, a behavior that only exists as long 
as the activity exists that keeps knowledge afloat. Once again, it is precisely for this purpose: 
to try and understand knowledge as action, of all knowing as doing, that Bentley realized that 
he needs semiotics.
As far as I have managed to find out, Bentley did not have a close connection with 
semiotics. He praises Charles Peirce in several occasions (e.g. 1941a: 19; 1954: 245-7), but 
rarely ever quotes him or makes use of his specialized terminology. The book Knowing and 
the Known includes a chapter titled «A confused ‘semiotic’», which is a critical analysis of 
Charles Morris’s book Signs, Language, Behavior (1946). As far as I can tell, this is the extent 
of Bentley’s connection with and knowledge about semiotics. To a certain extent then, what 
we have here is a case of semiotics as serendipity.
What follows is a brief summary of the world of signs as conceived by Arthur Bentley. 
First of all, he declares outright that «all behavior, when transactionally viewed, may be des-
cribed as sign-process from its earliest appearance onward» (1954: 297). He then divides such 
sign-process behaviors into three types: signaling, naming and symboling.
The first, the earliest, the simplest type of sign is, for Bentley, the signal, or rather, the 
sensory-manipulative-perceptive events, an activity of signaling. However, in his characte-
ristic way, he immediately rejects the signal-response paradigm for perception that in some 
quarters holds sway even today. For Bentley, there are no «objects of perception» as separate 
«things», and there is no specialized power or faculty of perception that would be completely 
closed off within the organism, so that perception would look like a confrontation between a 
thing and a capacity to perceive. Instead, «The locus of perceiving, transactionally viewed as 
signaling, is the full space and time of the activity of the organism and environment together 
in the given event» (ibid, 300). A signal covers all aspects of perceiving, moving about and 
manipulating things. Signs are not some sort of super-organic isolates, but refer to the entire 
field in process in system. Thus if a dog’s bark scares a rabbit, the signal is neither the bark, 
nor the dog as such, nor a specialized process taking place in the rabbit’s brain, it is always 
an aspect or phase of the situation seen in full. The primary distinguishing character of this 
type of sign is its indirectness. Signals are distinguished from simple mechanical causes by 
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the distance or the laxness of connection between the parts of the system that make up the 
sign. Thus when the shadow of a predator falls on a creature, the creature reacts, but not to the 
shadow, but to the predator. The shadow as a signal refers indirectly to the predator, and this 
is something the creature can make use of, something that would not be possible if the shadow 
was a mechanical cause for the reaction. Later on, this sort of indirectness develops into that 
well-known primary character of all more complex forms of representation, namely that they 
operate in absence of what they refer to.
The next level of complexity in sign usage is designation. This refers to the level of 
linguistic sign operation. Now for designation, or naming, he declares outright that words 
and meanings are inseparable. Severing word as «physical» from meaning as «mental» is 
rejected, since «[n]aming and knowing, in the region of knowing by way of language-using, 
form together a common phase of a single behavioral transaction, the phase of naming-as-
knowing» (ibid, 299). The named, the object referred to does not precede the name, but neither 
do names operate like all-powerful agents that, as if from the depths of their own sui generis 
powers, halt the flux of sensory information, place upon it a system of categories and thereby 
create perceived objects as if out of thin air. Bentley sees all formation of knowledge, assisted 
by the application of the behavior of designation, as a mutual process of constant attentive 
engagement with the environment, with knowledge forming within these relationships and 
behaviors, within the entire «transactional field». Neither knowledge nor designations can be 
reduced either to things-in-themselves, or to some mental faculties located purely within the 
organism and working like a mirror of nature. There is no solitary location where one can 
discover meaning as such and by itself, and neither is there pure verbal, object-less expression 
as such. The meanings of words that are severed from linguistic activity are not observable 
and thus incapable of being studied, and words separated from their meaningful appearance 
during active living processes are void of any meaning and thus constitute nothing at all: 
«Without life-in-process neither language nor linguistic meanings can survive any more than 
could other behavioral events, of whatever kind. […] Knowing through naming is a phase of 
human organism-in-action. In organism-in-action the knowing is the naming; so postulated; 
so observed; so investigated» (ibid, 344).
Finally, the last behavioral level that has been reached in the use of signs during the 
course of evolution is the use of symbols. Symbols, or more properly the behavioral activity 
of symboling, are a unique and special case of sign. A symbol is a sign that has been purified 
of all reference, of all designation. It is a sign that no longer functions as a name for anything 
else. It only operates within a system of other symbols, none of which refer to anything outside 
this system. Symbols are pure or purified signs. «This forfeiture is no loss», Bentley declares. 
«It strips the symbolings down for action» (ibid, 343). The best example of a pure symbol 
system is, naturally enough, mathematics, and mathematical symbols are the best example 
of symbols as Bentley conceived of them. But he is not, in fact, some latter day Pythagorean 
who thinks he has now discovered the pure and absolute underpinnings of all sign processes. 
symbols do not represent an absolute of signs, a pure essence of a sign or a culmination of a 
constantly evolving capacity for sign use; instead they are the result of a specific type of acti-
vity. Symbols have to be constantly maintained as symbols, and they are in a perpetual threat 
of slipping back into being mere designations. It requires constant vigilance, constant activity, 
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constant attention to keep symbols as symbols, and to prevent them from reducing back into 
designations. Furthermore, he does not think of the use of symbols as some natural capacity of 
a new type of creature, the animal symbolicum who has evolved a new sort of mental capacity 
to use an entirely new type of sign. As always, he rejects any reference to any sort of isolated, 
internal mental structure as invalid. Instead, symbols are what you can actively make out of 
other kinds of signs for use in specialized circumstances, primarily for acquiring scientific 
knowledge. Symbols are one way of operating with, or manipulating other types of signs – you 
get a symbol by purifying designations from any hint of representation.
Once again, why did Bentley need to come up with these semiotic distinctions? It was 
for the purpose of his double vision of looking at both particular knowledge and the basis or 
possibility of that knowledge that he saw he needed a semiotic terminology, a few snippets of 
which I have tried to describe here. Reflecting on the limitations of human knowledge, Bentley 
came up with this system of knowings as doings, of signs as behaviors that have to be cons-
tantly maintained, of sign-processes that need to be kept going through the constant comings 
and goings of active organisms in their environments. It is for understanding knowings and 
knowns in this sense that Bentley needed a semiotic approach and invented his own system of 
signs. Today a mere footnote in the history of sciences, Bentley should be re-inserted into the 
history of semiotics as a curious and unique semiotician.
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